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INTRODUCTION
Paul Meyer
MR. MEYER: Good afternoon. This is the session on dispute resolution.
My name is Paul Meyer. I am sort of old and new to this organization at the
same time. In 1982, I was a Canada-United States Law Institute Scholar to
Western.' I date back pretty far into the program, but I am new in the sense
that I am recently rejoining it. I am on the Advisory Board,2 and I bring a
different perspective than the trade perspective to some extent. I work in the
General Counsel's office of a $1.75 billion dollar publicly traded multina-
tional corporation.3 Our clients are primarily Fortune 500 companies or their
international equivalents.4 We specialize in workforce management.5 We
are an actuarial firm.6 In fact, of the 300 largest corporate plans in the world,
we serve as the actuarial consultant to about twenty percent of them. 7 We
also do human resource management consulting for companies in areas such
as health care, investment advising for pension funds, and executive compen-
1 See Canada-United States Law Institute, Executive and Advisory Board Biographies,
http://cusli.org/about/bios/bio-meyer.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
2 Id.
3 See id. (briefly discussing Paul A. Meyer's current employment with Watson Wyatt
Worldwide).
4 See WATSON WYATT WORLDWIDE, INC. ANNUAL REPORT (FORM 10-K) (2007),
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/investors/2007AR/downloads/ form.pdf (commenting on the
Watson Wyatt's goals and potential clientele).
5 See Watson Wyatt, Our Firm - Putting Clients First, http://www.watsonwyatt.com/
ourfirm (last visited Sept. 14, 2009) (describing Watson Wyatt's services).
6 See Watson Wyatt Global, Our History, http://www.watsonwyatt.com/ourfirm/vision
values.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2009).
7 See id. (commenting on Watson Wyatt's history).
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sation. Therefore, we have a fairly broad practice. We operate in literally
every market in the world.9
My role in the General Counsel's Office essentially started with a focus in
risk management. When we were a $300 million dollar company, Watson
Wyatt brought me in as a litigation guy. 10 At that time, about a third of our
litigation was in Canada." A peculiar thing, particularly in the actuarial
field, is that Canada for many years was the most litigious country in the
world.
12
In my role with the General Counsel's Office, I have been involved in
managing litigation over the last fifteen years.' 3 Over the fifteen years, we
began to see a different trend in our industry at the same time as the insur-
ance industry. We started to see more and more actuarial malpractice
claims.' 4 We found ourselves having to explain actuarial aspects of pension
law or insurance law to juries in Louisiana, Connecticut, Michigan, and
judges in places like Regina, Saskatchewan. These finders of fact really did
not know what we were talking about when we discussed complex actuarial
concepts.
15
As we progressed in managing complex litigation, we became interested
in the potential of arbitration as a way to get a panel that actually understood
the subject matter of the claim. In the first test case we did, we were in a
case that would have gone to jury trial. Our chief actuary and I convinced
the mayor of the city to go to arbitration. We had the federal rules of evi-
dence, we had full discovery, but we also had an independent tribunal. We
picked one arbitrator, they picked one, and together we picked a judge. We
had at least one person who knew what we were talking about and if they
decided we were wrong, we could live with that. I actually tried it myself,
and it was the last case I think I tried as primary trial counsel. At the end of
the arbitration, the two actuaries on the panel understood what we said. They
I See Watson Wyatt, Our Firm, supra note 5 (describing Watson Wyatt's services).
9 See Watson Wyatt, Global Locations, http://www.watsonwyatt.com/ourfirm/global
locations.asp (last visited Sept. 14, 2009) (listing every Watson Wyatt consulting office).
10 See Canada-United States Law Institute, Executive and Advisory Board, supra note 1
(stating Paul Meyer joined Watson Wyatt's litigation department in 1994).
1 See Hoover's Profile, Watson Wyatt Worldwide, Inc., http://www.answers.com/topic/
watson-wyatt-company-holdings (last visited on Sept. 15, 2009) (commenting on Watson
Wyatt's prominent role in the North America during the 1990s).
12 See generally Edward Andrew, John Robson & Owen Lippert, Law and Markets: Is
Canada Inheriting America's Litigious Legacy? J. OF CAN. STUD. (1999) (commenting on
Canada's increasing litigiousness).
13 See Canada-United States Law Institute, Executive and Advisory Board, supra note 1.
14 See William D. Hagar & Paul-Noel Chretien, The Emerging Law of Actuarial Malprac-
tice, 31 DRAKE L. REv. 831 (1982) (noting that actuarial malpractice claims have greatly in-
creased recently).
15 See generally id. (stating the actuary profession deals with complex business situations).
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concluded that we were not liable for malpractice, but should have explained
our work better, and ordered us to refund $10,000 in fees while dismissing
the $3.5 million malpractice claim. When we interviewed the panel after the
ruling we were surprised that the one judge on the panel had difficulty with
the technical issues, even though they were straight forward from our pers-
pective. This is consistent with our experience in court, where the former
prosecutors that typically populate the bench often have difficulty with coun-
terintuitive technical rules. In contrast, the two subject matter experts on the
panel completely understood the subtleties of our technical explanation of
what occurred.
This has driven us as a standard to accept arbitration as a dispute resolu-
tion model. In the handouts I put downstairs, there is an arbitration clause
we put in our standard terms and conditions in North America. 16 I have also
worked in developing the standard that we use in the western hemisphere, the
Asia Pacific, and the United Kingdom, but it all generally follows this ap-
proach. We do not believe that arbitration necessarily work well in any form,
but it does work well if you put it together right. The way that we want to
put it together, that makes sense for what we think will give us a fair shot of
explaining our work, is an independent tribunal where we pick one and the
other side picks one. Therefore, we know at least one person will have the
subject matter expertise that we need. Another rule is there has to be a cohe-
rent body of law that they follow. In North America, we follow the ADR
Institute of Canada Rules or the American Arbitration Association (AAA)
rules. 17  In other countries, I use the United Nations Commercial Trade
Rules, the UNCITRAL rules.
18
The final essential element is to have it administered by an organization
that is in the business of administering arbitrations. In the United States, we
typically choose administration by the AAA;' 9 and in Canada, the ADR Insti-
16 See generally Watson Wyatt & Co. v. SBC Holdings, 513 F.3d 646, (6th Cir. 2008)
(concerning a dispute over Watson Wyatt's standard arbitration clause).
17 See American Arbitration Association, Dispute Resolution Services,
http://www.adr.org/drs (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (stating AAA is the United States largest
alternative dispute resolution provider); see also ADR Institute of Canada, Who We Are What
We Do, http://www.adrcanada.ca/about/what-we-do.cftn (last visited Sept. 15, 2009) (com-
menting on ADR's services provided).
18 See United Nations on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf (last visited Sept.
15, 2009) (detailing UNCITRAL's arbitration rules).
19 See American Arbitration Association, About Us, http://www.adr.org/about (last visited
Sept. 15, 2009) (stating the AAA performs dispute resolution services in the United States).
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tute administers the arbitration.2° In other countries, the International Center
for Dispute Resolution administers the arbitration.21
We sometimes have to tailor this for different countries. We have come
up with different versions for the People's Republic of China,22 and Indone-
sia,23 but the same model drives the tailoring. This helps both in keeping the
dispute as a private matter between the parties and preventing misinterpreta-
tion by media or other parties that lack the full context of what occurred. To
sum up, we found that arbitration is not a perfect solution for all circums-
tances, and we still find ourselves like any big company from time to time in
court, but it has worked for us, and we like the way the model goes.
This helps us keep talking to the clients, first by promoting mediation, but
even if we are in arbitration, it is a different kind in a less adversary envi-
ronment that we are usually in. Also, in arbitration, we have confidentiality
that we would not have if we were on the docket of a court. Also, we have
new clients who ask us to identify pending litigation. Well, if you are in ar-
bitration that becomes a more manageable issue. We have found it is not a
perfect solution and we still find ourselves like any big company from time
to time in court, but it has worked for us.
Now, one thing I cannot really speak to is trade law or how this will fit in-
to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). We have a very
qualified panel to do that. One thing I can speak to is the London Court of
International Arbitration Rules. 24 One of the handouts I printed out is Article
6, which is the Arbitration Selection Rule of the London Court of Interna-
tional Arbitration (LCIA).25 That is a rule that requires your arbitrators to be
from a different country than the two parties in the arbitration in a case where
you are in an international arbitration.26 Now, from our perspective, that is
anathema to what we are trying to achieve because we are trying to achieve
20 See ADR Institute of Canada, supra note 17 (commenting on ADR's Canadian services
provided).
21 See Global Arbitration Reviews, The Asia Pacific Arbitration Review 2008: Singapore,
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/5/sections/ I/chapters/8 I/singapore/ (last
visited Sept. 16, 2009) (commenting on arbitration forums in Singapore included the ICDR).
22 See generally Jones Day, Arbitration in China, http://www.jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_
detail.aspx?publD=S1603 (last visited Sept. 16, 2009) (detailing arbitration procedures in
China).
23 See generally Badan Arbitrase Nasional Indonesia, Objectives and Scope of Activities,
http://www.bani-arb.org/bani-maineng.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2009) (containing infor-
mation about a leading arbitration service in Indonesia).
24 See London Court of International Arbitration, The LCIA Rules, http://www.lcia.org/
ARBfolder/ARB DOWNLOADS/ENGLISH/rules.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2009) (detailing
LCIA arbitration rules).
25 See id. at 6 (detailing article 6 of the LCIA rules).
26 See id.
[Vol. 34, No. 2]
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subject matter experts. How can you do that if you are dealing with different
countries?
For example, we are the investment adviser to a large pension scheme. If
we are in a dispute with a pension scheme in the United Kingdom, an arbitra-
tor qualified to practice in the United Kingdom could not appear under the
LCIA Rules even if the subject matter would normally be governed under
British pension law.27 And it notes that our United Kingdom affiliate has an
American parent, LCIA rules would preclude use of an American or a British
arbitrator.28 Therefore, you are dealing with United Kingdom legal issues,
and United Kingdom customs and practices, and you have to go outside of
the United Kingdom and the United States. 29 Yet, it gets worse. If you read
Article 6, you will see that you cannot use anyone else in the European Un-
ion.30 Now you cannot talk to anyone in the European Union who might
have subject matter expertise. Can we look to Canada or Australia? We also
have a wholly owned affiliate in Canada and Australia. 3' Does that exclude
Canada and Australia? Well, if it does, it also excludes the eighty or ninety
other countries where we have affiliates.32
Who is going to decide this dispute? It cannot be an Albania; they are in
the European Union. 33 It might be an Egyptian. Under the LCIA Rules one
could end up with kind of a ridiculous solution of you sre trying to find
people in an unrelated jurisdiction who understand the subject matter. This is
inconsistent with a primary basis to choose arbitration, to have disputes re-
solved by people who are competent to understand complex issues, often
based on local laws to ensure a just and reasonable resolution of a dispute.
Now, to make this more relevant here, I guess Elliot will be talking more
about NAFTA and how arbitration works with NAFTA, and John will follow
him.
27 See id. at 11 (detailing that the law applicable in an arbitration (if any) shall be the arbi-
tration law of the seat of arbitration and not the law of either party).
28 See id. at 6 (detailing that where the parties are of different nationalities, a sole arbitrator
or chairman of the Arbitral Tribunal shall not have the same nationality as any party).
29 See id.
30 id.
31 See Watson Wyatt, Global Locations, supra note 9 (listing every Watson Wyatt consult-
ing office).
32See id.
33 See generally Albania Officially Submits EU Candidacy Papers, EUBUSINEss, Apr. 28,
2009, available at http://www.eubusiness.com/news-eu/1240921021.43/ (stating Albania has
only applied to become a member of the European Union).
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UNITED STATES SPEAKER
Elliot J. Feldman
MR. FELDMAN: Thank you, Paul. We asked Paul to say something
about the London arrangement because that is the end point that I am going
to talk about. The governments of Canada and the United States adopted the
London rules to resolve softwood lumber disputes arising out of the Soft-
wood Lumber Agreement.34 He characterized it as "absurd," and I think that
is probably a fair characterization.
What I am going to say may help explain how we got there. I have pro-
moted the reform of the North American Free Trade Agreement's (NAFTA)
Chapter 19 for many years.35 I have brought with me a copy of a report we
did. I litigated my first Chapter 19 case in 1989,36 and I began to experience
and understand both its strengths and weaknesses by 1991. In 2004, my
firm, Baker & Hostetler, developed comprehensive analyses of both Chapters
19 and 11 for the Canadian-American Business Council, which organized its
annual meeting around presentations of these reports.37
Elliot J. Feldman is the Leader of Baker Hostetler's international trade practice. Dr.
Feldman is a former Director of the Canadian-American Business Council and a former Spe-
cial Project Officer and Consultant in the United States Department of Defense. He has been a
Fellow of the Woodrow Wilson and Danforth Foundations, the German Marshall Fund of the
United States, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Center for European Studies and the
Center for International Affairs of Harvard University, and the Lincoln Institute of Land Poli-
cy. Dr. Feldman taught at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International
Studies, the University of British Columbia, Brandeis, and Tufts Universities. He is the author
of eight books. Dr. Feldman testified five times as an expert witness before the Standing
Committee on International Trade of the Canadian House of Commons, twice on the Softwood
Lumber dispute between Canada and the United States, twice on the future of NAFTA and its
dispute resolution system, and once on the details of legislation pending before the House.
His client advice on the Softwood Lumber Agreement has been selected by the Librarian of
the Canadian House of Commons as a historic document.
34 See John R. Crook, United States and Canada Arbitrate a Softwood Lumber Dispute in
the London Court of International Arbitration, 102 A.J.I.L. 192 (2008).
35 See generally CANADA - UNITED STATES LAW INSTITUTE, ANNUAL CONFERENCE
PROGRAM 16 (2009), available at http://cusli.org/conferences/annual/annual_2009/documen
tation/2009 CUSLIConference Program.pdf (commenting on Elliot Feldman's extensive
experience in the North American Free Trade Agreement).
6 See Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Pork from Canada, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, March 8,
1991, available at http://registry.nafta-sec-alena.org/cmdocuments/808bbbaf-a78c-416c-9879-
08e994c6bea7.pdf.
37 See THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN BUSINESS COUNCIL AND THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, INVESTMENT AND TRADE DISPUTES IN NORTH AMERICA:
[Vol. 34, No. 2]
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Of the two, our Chapter 19 analysis was more important, for it went to the
heart of NAFTA itself. For Canadians, NAFTA's purpose was to secure
access to the United States market.38 The United States rejected the idea that
a free trade zone should not be encumbered by contingency protection meas-
ures such as countervailing duties and antidumping and safeguards, but was
willing to compromise.39 Without this compromise, there would not have
been a free trade agreement.
Prime Minister Paul Martin in Canada liked our Chapter 19 analysis in
2004. His first address in the United States as Prime Minister in Sun Valley
called for meetings among the three amigos to give Chapter 19 the new life
we set out.40 The United States, however, was not interested, and although
Mexican President Vicente Fox publicly endorsed the Canadian initiative,
American recalcitrance left it without traction.4' Our report, just shy of a
hundred pages, detailed Chapter 19's weaknesses and proposed specific re-
42 4forms. All the change necessary was possible without reopening NAFTA.43
The United States, for example, could have moved the NAFTA Secreta-
riat out of the Commerce Department, where it came dangerously under the
Department's influence. 44 Canada could have declined collaboration with the
United States to circumvent rules, for example, creating an illegal suspension
INSTITUTIONAL FAILURES AND GOVERNMENT APPREHENSION: DUTIES AND DUMPING: WHAT'S
GOING WRONG WITH CHAPTER 19?, available at http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/HET/Softwood
/June%202004%20Paper%20by%20Baker%20%2OHos.pdf.
38 See BELAY SEYOUM, EXPORT-IMPORT THEORY, PRACTICES, AND PROCEDURES 26 (2d. ed.
2009) (stating NAFTA provided Canada with secure access to a large consumer market).
39 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter Nineteen: Review and Dispute
Settlement in Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Matters, http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343&mtpilD=152 (last visited Sept. 22, 2009) (detailing NAFTA's
Chapter 19 provisions that include protective measures originally rejected by the United
States).
40 See generally Patrick Brethour, NAFTA Needs Fixing, PM Says, TRADE OBSERVATORY,
July 9, 2004, http://www.iatp.org/tradeobservatory/headlines.cfm?reflD=36230 (commenting
on Paul Martin's intention for NAFTA reform while speaking in Sun Valley, Idaho).
41 See Stephen J. Powell, Expanding the NAFTA Chapter 19 Dispute Settlement System: A
Way to Declaw Trade Remedy Laws in a Free Trade Area of the Americas?, 16 LAW & BUS.
REV. AM. 2 (Spring 2010).
42 See THE CANADIAN-AMERICAN BUSINESS COUNCIL AND THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, supra note 37.
43 See generally Chuck Dittrich, Trade Policy Forecast, NAT'L FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL,
Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.nftc.org/newsflash/newsflash.asp?Mode=View&articleid=2012&
Category-All (commenting on the ability for NAFTA reform without reopening the agree-
ment).
44 See NAFTA Secretariat, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/en/view.aspx?x=283#What%20is%20the%20NAFTA%20Secretariat (last visited
Sept. 22, 2009) (stating that the NAFTA Secretariat is accountable to the NAFTA Free Trade
Commission).
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of an extraordinary challenge. 45 The United States could have made timely
appointments to panels, and timely payments to panelists for their services.
Canada could have refused the appointment of panelists who had been
Commerce Department lawyers in NAFTA cases defending the United
States. Reforms merely required a commitment to fix things, especially
those that were not working because the Parties were not respecting the rules,
the law, or their obligations. In the end, there was no such commitment.4 6
Today, five years later, I have reached a different conclusion from my
earlier optimistic view of reform. Despite the easy rhetoric that the Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) and NAFTA did not contemplate resolving the
American complaint over Canadian softwood lumber through Chapter 19,
promoted by everyone from Gordon Richie to David Emerson who were
eager to reach a settlement with the United States, the opposite is true. Ar-
guably, Chapter 19's purpose was to resolve the softwood lumber dispute. It
is simply false that Chapter 19 excluded lumber. It was not softwood lumber
that alone broke the back of Chapter 19. The governments broke Chapter 19
through the lumber cases and others. Now, in my view, there remains only
one conclusion: Chapter 19 is broken. There is a consequence for Canadians.
Chapter 19 is now dangerous, and therefore we should probably abolish it.
I am going to present my remarks in three parts. First, I intend to show
that all three dispute resolution mechanisms in NAFTA are effectively dead.
Second, I will suggest that they represent an old agenda not usefully the fo-
cus of a serious or sustained effort to deepen Canadian-United States rela-
tions. Finally, I will suggest that Canada and the United States start over, in
a different place, to build relations for the future. For this proposal, I will put
the burden on Canada.
The most important of the dispute resolution mechanisms, what I already
have suggested many analysts have deemed the essence of NAFTA is Chap-
ter 19,47 was created to resolve trade remedy disputes swiftly and outside
national court systems that many Canadians thought to be biased.48 Chapter
19 was to give North American businesses confidence in fair and swift jus-
45 See Ontario Forest Industries Association v. Government of Canada, No. 06-989
(D.D.C. 2006).
46 See generally Powell, supra note 41 (commenting on the deficiencies of Chapter 19 and
possible reforms that could improve the dispute resolution process).
47 See, e.g., Patrick Macrory, NAFTA Chapter 19: A Successful Experiment on Interna-
tional Trade Dispute Resolution, 168 C.D. HowE INST. COMMENT. 1 (2002) (describing Chap-
ter 19 as the centerpiece of NAFTA's dispute resolution process).
48 See John R. Magnus, Tradewins LLC, Presented to American University, Washington
College of Law Conference: Lessons from NAFTA Part I: The Softwood Lumber Dispute
(Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/magnuschapterl9.pdf
(commenting on the purpose of Chapter 19).
[Vol. 34, No. 2]
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tice. 49 The United States, however, never liked Chapter 19,50 and Canada did
not long appreciate its unique value.51 Both governments eventually were
willing to destroy it for what they considered higher priorities.52
NAFTA Article 1904.14 provides that "The rules shall be designed to re-
sult in final decisions within three hundred fifteen days of the date on which
a request for a panel is made. 53 As you can see from this first slide, Canada
does not use Chapter 19 as much. Only four cases went to completion during
the last eight years, 4 and parties only filed two more during that period, both
terminating without decisions.55 More recent Chapter 19 disputes in the
United States have taken four years or more, typically much longer than dis-
pute resolution in court proceedings.56 The United States extended Chapter
19 into extraordinary challenges almost every time it lost a panel decision,
predictably losing every extraordinary challenge,57 while Canada, as a matter
of principle, never exercised its extraordinary challenge rights.58  These
slides show the duration of these cases that were supposed to end in three
hundred fifteen days by statute.59
These are the extraordinary challenges the panel upheld every time except
the last one, where the United States and Canada collaborated to suspend the
60proceedings, something that I will not discuss at length now but would be
happy to if you had questions. This is what happened with the lumber cases
and how long they took to resolve, and how many in fact simply terminated
with the softwood lumber deal. The United States even used the extraordi-
nary challenge committee process to block an adverse panel outcome in
softwood lumber, later to claim a victory in a case it actually lost while aban-
doning the extraordinary challenge. 61 NAFTA panels originally had the cou-
49 See Elliot J. Feldman, The Next American President: Challenges for the United States
and North America, CENTER FOR UNITED STATES STUDIES AND MNISTERE DES RELATIONS
INTERNATIONALES UNIVERSITE Du QUEBEC A MONTREAL 3 (2009).
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 NAFTA Secretariat, Rules of Procedure for Article 1904, http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/en/view.aspx?conlD=653&mtpilD=209 (last visited Sept. 28, 2009).
54 See Feldman, supra note 49.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 See David A. Gantz, The United States and NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Ambivalence,
Frustration and Occasional Defiance, 06-26 Az. LEGAL STUD. 356, 380 (2009).
58 id.
59 See ELLIOT J. FELDMAN, NAFTA CHAPTERS 11, 19, AND 20, 1-5, (2009), available at
http://cusli.org/conferences/annual/annual_2009/presentations/Feldman.pdf.
" See id at 3.
61 See Feldman, supra note 49, at 4.
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rage to challenge governments; eventually, outside of lumber, they deferred
even when the law demanded that they exercise their own authority.62
Although there are startling examples of Chapter 19's failures, by far the
most important came through the 2006 softwood lumber agreement, where
the United States stalled cases interminably and Canadians eventually were
forced to pay one billion dollars to settle legal cases they had won before bi-
national panels and in United States courts. 6 3 Just as a notation, the situation
for Chapter 19 with Mexico is no better. The data is not entirely reliable
because the Secretariat in Mexico does not maintain complete records, but as
you can see from this slide, of nine cases brought since 2000, all by Ameri-
cans, only two panels have reached decisions, none since 2004. 64 Canadians
have not challenged a Mexican trade decision under Chapter 19 since 1996.65
Four panels are still pending on behalf of American interests, one dating back
to 2005.66 Whereas five Mexican challenges to United States decisions at the
beginning of NAFTA, in 1994 and 1995, were all completed in about eigh-
teen months.67 However, only one panel completed its work in less than two
years since 1999.68 Of twenty-six panels launched since 2000, only five
seem to have completed their work as envisioned in the agreement.69 Only
one bi-national panel ever completed its work.7°
Chapter 19 was a gift to Mexico, effectively negotiated by Canada, which
Mexico does not seem to have fully appreciated. Indeed the Mexican capitu-
lation after years of conflict over cement, paying $150 million to end the
dispute with the United States, became something of a model for Canadians
buying their way out of lumber, consequences of a failed dispute resolution
system.
Some critics think Chapter 11, uniquely among the novel NAFTA me-
chanisms, has been a success, at least on its own terms.71 Three times, Unit-
ed States corporations extracted awards or settlements from the government
of Canada, twice for several million dollars.72 The smallest award, in the
62 id.
63 Id.
64 See FELDMAN, supra note 59, at 4.
65 See id.
66 See id.
67 See id. at 5.
61 See id.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See Elizabeth Whitsitt, NAFTA fifteen years later: the successes, failures, and future
prospects of Chapter 11, INvEsTMENT TREATY NEWS, Feb. 16, 2009, available at
http://www.investmenttreatynews.org/cms/news/archive/2009/02/17/nafta-fifteen-years-later-
the-successes-failures-and-future-prospects-of-chapter- I.aspx.
72 See Feldman, supra note 49, at 4.
[Vol. 34, No. 2]
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Pope and Talbot case, penalized Canada for dilatory tactics.73 However, the
last time an investor won anything from Canada was seven years ago.74 The
United States government has managed to prevail in every case, even when,
in more than one case, the law and facts seemed entirely on the side of the
Canadian investor.75 What critics perceived as a huge threat to governments
frequently is now an expensive and protracted dead end for private interests.
Chapter I l's primary purpose was to protect Canadian and American in-
vestments in Mexico, where there is a history of government expropriation.76
Canadian and American governments were both shocked and resentful to be
the subjects of private investor complaints. Mexico, however, has been the
subject of many more allegations,77 and has been a little less successful than
Canada or the United States in defeating them, 78 paying out over $50 million
dollars in three cases,79 the most recent to Archer Daniels Midland in 2007
for $33.5 million.8°
Still in all, of fifty-nine Chapter 11 cases filed against the three govern-
ments, investors have prevailed only six times. Three Canadian companies
tried to recover financial losses from the softwood lumber cases through
Chapter 11, arguing that the United States government had applied its trade
laws unlawfully and had stolen from these companies hundreds of millions of
dollars. 8' The United States argued successfully, before a questionable con-
solidation tribunal that included the spouse of the President's first cousin, that
the existence of Chapter 19 within NAFTA prevented Canadians from seek-
ing damages resulting from the abuse of the trade laws. Thus, Canadian in-
vestors, according to the United States, and without protest from the govern-
ment of Canada, have fewer rights than the citizens of other countries with
stand-alone bilateral investment treaties with the United States.
73 See APPLETON ASSOCIATES, BACKGROUNDER: NAFTA AWARD POPE & TALBOT, INC. AND
CANADA 1-2, available at http://www.appletonlaw.com/cases/P&T-Backgrounder.pdf.
74 See FELDMAN, supra note 59, at 6.
75 Id.
76 See Adnan Kagalwalla, NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunals and Their Impact on Signatory
States: A Parallel Judicial System and Its Many Potential Dangers, 3.1 ENTREPRENEURIAL
Bus. L.J. 99 (1998).
77 See Feldman, supra note 49, at 6.
78 See id.
79 See generally Lawrence Herman, Trade Law Memo - Volume 4 Issue 4 - NAFTA In-
vestment Disputes Grind Along, CASSEL BROCK LAWYERS (2001), http://www.cassels
brock.com/CBNewsletter/Trade-Law-Memo Volume_4_Issue_4 NAFTAInvestment_
Disputes Grind Along (commenting on the low value of Chapter 11 payouts).
86 See EIGHTEENTH MEETING OF THE NAFTA ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PRIVATE
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, MINUTES 6, available at http://www.nafia-alena.gc.ca/NAFTA/
CMFILES/Meeting%2OMinutes/Minutes- 1 8th%20meeting-Vancouver.pdf.
81 See Feldman, supra note 49, at 4.
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Chapter 20's purpose was a formal and transparent replacement for be-
hind-the-scenes diplomacy.82 Deployment was successful in the early FTA
years. It was then Chapter 18, but subsequently abandoned.83 More than a
decade passed since either Canada or the United States convened a Chapter
20 panel. 84  Mexico filed a challenge to United States trucking policy in
1998.85 The panel ruled in Mexico's favor in 2001.86 In 2009, Mexico finally
is resorting to retaliatory tariffs because the United States never respected the
results of the Chapter 20 process.8 7
Government leaders, occasionally urged to utilize Chapter 20 to revitalize
Chapter 19, declined to use Chapter 20.88 Instead, they reverted to resolving
matters privately, or not at all.89 The jury is no longer out. Leaders aban-
doned Chapter 20.90 They manipulated Chapter 11 into a private investor
protection diminished by its very presence as part of NAFTA. 91 They crip-
pled Chapter.92 Under NAFTA's rules, any party to trade remedy litigation
involving the merchandise of one of the NAFTA parties has the right to re-
move the litigation from courts to a NAFTA Chapter 19 panel.93 Whereas
NAFTA panels had once accorded parties a fair shot at vindication against
protectionist trade policies, now the parties established that the idea of swift
and fair justice no longer exists. Canadian parties in the softwood lumber
cases, for the first time in the history of the FTA and NAFTA, took one ap-
peal directly to United States courts, 94 and a second to United States courts in
82 See JOHN KIRTON, NAFTA DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISMS: AN OVERVIEW 3-4
(2004), available at http://www.envireform.utoronto.ca/publications/john-kirton/may27-
2004.pdf (commenting on the transparent procedures of Chapter 20).
83 See Gantz, supra note 57, at 385 (commenting on FTA Chapter 18 as a model used for
NAFTA Chapter 20).
84 See WorldTradeLaw.net, NAFTA Chapter 20 Arbitration Panel Reports,
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/nafta20/index.htm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (detailing the last
Chapter 20 arbitration decision was issued in 2001).
85 See In the Matter of Cross-Border Trucking Services (Mex. v. U.S), USA-MEX-98-
2008-01 6 (2001).
86 See id. at 81-82.
87 See Mexico Trucker Online, The Extreme Cost of Mexican Tariffs on US Businesses,
http://mexicotrucker.com/the-extreme-cost-of-mexican-tariffs-on-us-businesses (last visited
Oct. 5, 2009).
88 See Gantz, supra note 57, at 388-391 (explaining why Chapter 20 has fallen into disuse
over the previous decade).
89 See id. at 392.
90 See generally id at 388-391 (commenting on Chapter 20's disuse over the previous
decade).91 See generally id. (commenting on the purpose of Chapter 11).
92 See Magnus, supra note 48 (commenting on Chapter 19's flaws).
93 NAFTA Secretariat, Rules of Procedure , supra note 53.
94 See COALITION FOR FAIR LABOR IMPORTS, UNITED STATES- CANADA LUMBER TRADE
DISPUTE: A BRIEF HISTORY (2009), http://www.fairlumbercoalition.org/doc/dispute-history
.pdf.
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order to confirm a NAFTA panel decision.95 Canadian provincial govern-
ments, as a matter of principle, always removed to bi-national panels, but in
lumber they had to concede that circumstances now exist when their interests
might be better served outside NAFTA.
96
This repudiation of NAFTA, confirmed in the 2006 softwood lumber
agreement's dispute resolution mechanism, 97 now presents a danger for Ca-
nadian interests. United States petitioners remove appeals to NAFTA panels,
confident that the dispute will not be resolved for years, while Canadians
deposit duties, which may not have legal authorization. As matters now
stand with Chapter 11, Canadians might not be able to do anything about it.
Although the Coalition for Fair Lumber Imports twice challenged Chapter
19's constitutionality,98 today it is more likely to see Chapter 19 as a best
friend.
The bilateral international agenda today is not the agenda of the 1980s.
Then, the primary concerns were to eliminate tariffs and to facilitate the reso-
lution of trade disputes. The concerns were to enhance trade, and to give the
private sector and provincial and state governments greater voices in the res-
olution of disputes and in the charting of the continent's destiny.
NAFTA largely eliminated the tariffs.99 It appears, however, impotent to
arrest the protectionist trends arising from the United States Congress that
threaten market access not only for Canadians, but also for all trade partners.
Without recourse to Chapter 20 and confidence in Chapter 19, NAFTA ap-
pears to offer nothing special to assure free trade. Without a more functional
Chapter 11, not handicapped by the agreement itself, it does nothing to at-
tract foreign investment.
The bilateral Canadian-American agenda was never only about trade and
commerce, but the FTA and the subsequent NAFTA seemed to suck the oxy-
gen out of almost everything else. That is why, as the Government of Cana-
da claims, it had to settle the softwood lumber dispute in such a brutal and
costly way, to open up the bilateral relationship to other issues that it con-
cluded were more important, particularly the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative and the Security and Prosperity Partnership.100
" See id.
96 See generally id. (commenting on the history of the United States - Canadian Softwood
Lumber Dispute).
97 See Softwood Lumber Agreement Between The Government of Canada and The Gov-
ernment of the United States of America Art. 14, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/controls-
controles/assets/pdfs/softwood/SLA-en.pdf (last visited Dec. 25, 2009).
98 See Coalition for Fair Labor Imports, supra note 94, at 2.
99 See, e.g., FedEx Trade Networks, NAFTA Solutions Questions, http://fedex.com/us/
customersupport/ftn/faq/nafta.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2009).
100 See United States Department of Homeland Security, WHTI Land and Sea Final Rule,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/whtilandseafinalrule.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2009); see
13
Meyer et al.: North American Dispute Resolution
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 2008
CANADA-UNITED STATES LA W JOURNAL
Canadians typically interpret their problems with the United States self-
righteously. All the metaphors about elephants and mice, 10 or sneezes and
colds, 0 2 rest on the idea that the United States is dangerous even when inno-
cent, and Canada is always a victim. Whenever the United States has been
willing to create equality through a rule of law, Canada eventually reverted to
diplomacy. The hubris of the victim is that it suffers despite being superior.
Canada's hubris is a belief that it can persuade the United States to appreciate
it more, and outwit the United States at the negotiating table. Canada for its
own sake needs to get back to rules, forget about sympathy, and recognize
that the agenda has changed.
Today's bilateral agenda is about green technology and competition from
Asia. 103 It is about energy independence and continental security on the
ground, with threats more likely from individuals with dangerous luggage
than from intercontinental ballistic missiles. 0 4 The agenda today is about
avian flu that could kill thousands in a week and knows no borders or natio-
nalities, not Asian flu that disables millions for days but rarely kills anyone.
NAFTA is ill suited for this new agenda. NAFTA says little about the
threats at the border, preoccupied as it is with moving goods, not people,
efficiently, and with getting across the border, not protecting it.1 °5 It is
preoccupied with producing more energy, not with diversifying and not with
cleaning up the environment. Canada's tar sands might compete admirably
with Arab oil, and only when the price is right, but they do not improve car-
bon emissions. NAFTA is silent on public health, 10 6 and less and less for a
Commonwealth, on the North American continent.
It is not that there is nothing worth saving or improving in NAFTA, but
that NAFTA is the wrong architecture for the future. Instead of sighing in
relief that President Obama has deferred further discussion of NAFTA
reform, Canada should actively promote an alternative. Instead of talking
about reform of the dispute systems, Canadians should welcome talking
about something else entirely, and starting over again.
Some will draw a contrary conclusion from my analysis. They may agree
that NAFTA has failed, but they would prefer enhancing what is left of Ca-
nadian and Mexican sovereignty. They see the United States as a threat to
their independence. In my view, NAFTA's preservation of competing conti-
also The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, http://www.spp.gov (last
visited Dec. 20, 2009) (commenting on the problems the Softwood Lumber Agreement creates
for Canada).
101 See Feldman, supra note 49, at 6.
102 See id.
103 See id. at 7.
'04 See id.
105 See id.
106 See id.
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nental sovereignties, which Chapters 11, 19, and 20 embrace, has become an
obstacle to an institutional economic integration that is critical to the future
success of all three countries. 10 7 The economy that has spiraled downward
since last September has proved the reality, if not always the attraction, of
globalization. Canadian-United States interdependence is inescapable, but
largely unmanaged. 108 There should have been a coordinated, coherent North
American response to the global financial crisis, but NAFTA has done noth-
ing to enable one. As long as it is the dominant institutional feature on the
continent's landscape, there will not be one.
NAFTA was once a bold, inventive beginning, an answer to conventional
thinking. The dispute mechanisms were innovative; the inclusion of a devel-
oping country, politically and economically, in an exclusive trade area with
much more developed countries, was almost experimental, and yet it worked.
Today, however, NAFTA is the old convention. It contributes to our pros-
perity, but does not alleviate economic failure and stands in the way of the
new agenda. 0 9 It sustains a status quo.
Statistics can be deceptive, and we cannot know what might have been
without NAFTA. Perhaps the economic results could have been worse.
Look at the data on these slides; trade grew with the rest of the world during
the last decade, but it did not grow within the North American continent."0
It is reasonable to believe that if NAFTA were the success it should have
been, the economic results should have been better, and we should be better
equipped to deal with new challenges.
Just compare for a moment NAFTA's internal trade development during
this decade, as measured through imports with Europe's. Europe's has been
growing."' NAFTA's has not." 2 The task, I think, is to appraise the new
century's challenges and decide what the parties, Canada, the United States
and Mexico, want to do about them. A place to begin may be with President
Obama's recent sketch for trade policy. 1
3
It was short on trade and long on a comprehensive view integrating trade
with energy, education, healthcare, and environmental protection. 1 4 It pro-
posed a new agenda in which an understanding of trade does not rest on trade
alone. NAFTA occupies political as well as economic space. It has been too
successful as a barrier to continental integration, helping preserve multiple
107 See id. at 8.
'o' See id.
109 See id.
110 See FELDMAN, supra note 59, at 7.
"' See id. at 8.
112 See id.
113 See On the Issues, Barack Obama on Free Trade, http://www.issues2000.org/2008/
BarackObamaFreeTrade.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
114 See id.
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sovereignties at the potential expense of mutual prosperity.1 15 It is time now
to replace the 20th century agenda and figure out what to do about the 21 st's.
Canadians have never had greater reasons to be suspicious about the
United States than they have had over the last eight years. And yet, Cana-
dians cannot afford the luxury of these justified suspicions. The alternative
to deeper North American integration is not a splendid and prosperous isola-
tion, but more a marginalization in the world economy and in world affairs.
Canada now has an opportunity for leadership, but only if it retires preoc-
cupying debates of the last two centuries. Canada must look not only
beyond, but also for now, at least, away from NAFTA. The President has
retreated on NAFTA. Canada should seize the moment and embrace Presi-
dent Obama's closing remarks in Ottawa on February 19, his call to "renew
and deepen our relationship for the 21 st century." 1
16
The architecture of the world's institutions is undergoing profound
change, mostly out of necessity. Change, however, is not necessarily the
same as invention. The world's financial institutions have to be changed.
Canada may provide a model. The world needs a new system for protecting
the environment. The world's trading system will evolve and change; the
world needs effective ways to combat terrorism. Instead of focusing on in-
cremental change, Canada should declare itself for innovation. It should
initiate partnership, not merely in an incremental commitment to climate
technology, but in a new and comprehensive treaty for North America.
I am not the first to note what ought to be on the agenda: environmental
clean-up linked to trade; green technologies at the heart of commerce; border
security that is continental, trustworthy enough at the peripheries to relax the
internal borders; financial institutions that at least coordinate in response to
pressures from the rest of the world; and genuinely shared security bur-
dens.117 The agenda should not be a compartmentalized list of assignments
to different line agencies and ministries. Instead, we must see the agenda as
a single responsibility that one treaty might address, one set of institutions
coordinated and managed jointly. President Obama has proven already to be
a remarkable listener and a flexible pragmatist. He does not have to create or
own an idea in order to embrace it.
115 See ROBERT A. PASTOR, BEYOND NAFTA: THE EMERGENCE AND FuTURE OF NORTH
AMERICA 1 (2007), available at http://wwwl.american.edu/ia/cnas/pdfs/workingpaper6_rp.pdf
(commenting on the lack of continental integration under NAFTA).
116 See Prime Minister of Canada, President Obama and Prime Minister Harper Vow Joint
Effort on North American Economic Recovery, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2432
(last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
117 See generally On the Issues, supra note 113 (commenting on Barak Obama's agenda for
his presidency).
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As Jessica suggested last night, here is Canada's time and chance.1 18 Ca-
nadians have long imagined themselves greener, more environmentally con-
scious and socially responsible than Americans.11 9 Canadians trumpet the
rule of law, but routinely retreat to diplomacy. They blame the United States
for Chapter 19's failures, without acknowledging their own complicity.
120
Now, by embracing trade within a greater agenda, they can make themselves
indispensable partners without retracing worn out paths.
Canadians like to tout international surveys claiming Canada to be a safer
and healthier place to live than the United States. 12 Now Canada should set
out to prove it, not by contrasting itself, not by protecting itself as if the Unit-
ed States were diseased, but by being the source of pragmatic, cooperative
ideas that could integrate the continent and make it more competitive. A new
continental architecture fit for the 21st century is needed, not the reform of
NAFTA. Thank you.
118 See generally Canada-United States Law Institute, supra note 35 at 21 (noting Jessica
LeCroy's speech at the Canada-United States Institute's 2009 annual conference).
119 See Little Drops, Big Ripples: Canadians are Concerned About What's Going Down
Our Drains, REUTERS, March 20, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/pressRelease
/idUS147420+20-Mar-2009+MW20090320 (commenting on Canadian concerns with the
environment).
120 See generally Gantz, supra note 57 at 383 (commenting on the problems the United
States has had with NAFTA Chapter 19).
121 See Vancouver English Centre, Student Safety in Vancouver Canada, http://www.vec.ca
/english/2/safety.cfin (last visited Oct. 12, 2009) (commenting on how Canada is safer than the
United States).
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CANADIAN SPEAKER
John A. Terry
MR. TERRY: As a Canadian, thanks for the challenge. I am going to
disappoint people by not living up to the challenge, at least not this after-
noon. You will have to give us a little more time to respond to the challenge.
During our great evening session yesterday, one of the speakers made a
point about the rule of law, the importance of rule of law, the fact that Henry
King and others at the Institute always focused on the centrality of that prin-
ciple and its importance in Canada-United States relations. 22 As a trade
lawyer, as a Canadian trade lawyer, 123 I am a believer in the rule of law as
much as anyone else. I have a lot of sympathy and support for the views that
Elliot puts forward on his behalf, and really on behalf of Canada, because he
does a lot of work on behalf of Canadians on some of these issues.
It is true that Chapter 19 has not functioned as it should have, but to some
extent, again, as a Canadian who looks out and may be too pragmatic on
these sorts of things, we have had that same experience with the World Trade
Organization. We have had long battles with Brazil, for example, over air-
craft subsidies. 124 We tend to find that despite the dispute mechanisms we
have put into place, realpolitik tends to continue to play the role it has always
or has traditionally played. 125 With respect to Chapter 19, I defer to you on
John Terry has extensive experience with business, international trade, and public law
litigation. Mr. Terry's civil litigation practice focuses on business, international trade, and
public law. He has appeared as counsel at all levels of court in Ontario, at the Federal Court
and Federal Court of Appeal, before the Supreme Court of Canada, in commercial arbitrations,
and before a variety of administrative tribunals. Mr. Terry regularly provides advice to corpo-
rations and federal, provincial, and municipal governments on NAFTA and WTO matters. He
has acted for and advised major Canadian and multinational corporations in respect of inves-
tor-state arbitrations under Chapter 11 of the NAFTA.
122 See Canada-United States Law Institute, About the Institute - History,
http://cusli.org/about/history.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
13 See Canada-United States Law Institute, Biographies - John A. Taylor,
http://cusli.org/aboutibios/bio terry.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2009).
1 4 See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: Brazil Export Financing Programme
for Aircraft, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu~e/cases-e/ds46_e.htm (last visited
Oct. 12, 2009).
125 See John H. Jackson, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding- Misunderstandings
on the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 61 (1997) (commenting on the role
realpolitik had on a WTO dispute settlement).
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that point, and frankly I do not practice that much in that particular area. I
can see what is broken. I am not sure that the London Court of International
Arbitration provisions in the softwood lumber fixed that in that context. 26 I
agree with you on that.
With respect to Chapter 11, though, I am not so sure that I do agree that it
is something that does not work. In fact, one of the benefits as we all know
that we get from Chapter 11 is that individuals initiate it,127 and cost conse-
quences and various things might get in the way of those individuals bringing
those complaints. However, those individuals are not going to engage in
diplomacy. The individual companies will do what they can to lobby gov-
ernment to try to resolve the dispute, but in the end, if it is in the interest of
those companies to go to dispute resolution, they will.
I am going to focus my remarks here on Chapter 11, bearing in mind that
Michael did set the table for us this morning with his analysis in his discus-
sion of Chapter 11.128 1 will try to avoid retreading that ground there. I want
to focus on Chapter 11, where we are on Chapter 11, how we got there in
terms of that dispute resolution mechanism, and what we predict for the im-
mediate future with respect to some of the key issues dealt with under Chap-
ter 11. Then, I would like to, consistently with what our panel description
talked about, come up with a few recommendations. Again, as an archetypal
Canadian, these are modest Canadian proposals as opposed to substantial
"start-over" reforms. These are things that I, as someone who has practiced
substantially in the area of Chapter 11 cases and also in bilateral investment
treaty cases internationally, 129 believe are process questions that might deal
with what I see as some of the key problems under Chapter 11.
To start, I would like to talk about where we are right now under Chapter
11. We are at more or less the ten-year mark of making decisions under
Chapter 11 130 The history divides into three periods, the first going back
before the first decision and commencing from the date the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was agreed to and put into effect: I call this
126 See generally Office of the United States Trade Representative, Tribunal Finds Canada
Failed to Cure Breach of the Softwood Lumber Agreement, http://www.ustr.gov/about-
us/press-office/press-releases/2009/september/tribunal-finds-canada-failed-cure-breah-
softwoo (last visited Oct. 14, 2009) (commenting on a LCIA decision in a softwood lumber
case).
127 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 11: Investment,
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-I 11.asp#Sec.B (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
1 See generally Canada-United States Law Institute, supra note 35 at 13 (stating Michael
Lynk spoke earlier in the morning).
129 See Torys L.L.P., Our Team: John A. Terry, http://www.torys.com/OurTeam/Pages
/TerryJohnA.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2009).
130 See generally PUBLIC CITIZEN, TABLE OF "CHAPTER 11" FOREIGN INVESTOR-STATE
CASES AND CLAIMS (2009), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Chl 1CasesChart-
2009.pdf.
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the "sleeper" period. Then the next period, I call the "creative" period under
Chapter 11. Finally, we are in a subtler period now. You can equate it to
Picasso with his stages. I would argue we are settling into more of a mature,
subtle Chapter 11.
The sleeper period took place in the negotiation of the NAFTA and im-
mediately following that time because frankly I can tell you from the Cana-
dian perspective I do not think more than a handful of people in Canada un-
derstood what Canada was agreeing to when it signed on to Chapter 11.
From what I understand from people who were involved in those negotia-
tions, Chapter 1 1 emerged initially from concerns that focused on energy and
on Mexico. 131 Once discussions began in earnest, they were broadened so
that eventually, there was a complete table on investment,' 32 and then once
during the negotiations, that naturally turned to more or less the United States
model of bilateral investment treaty that had been negotiated by that time. At
that time, from the Canadian perspective, there were only a handful of bila-
teral investment treaties that had been negotiated, and Canadians were very
unfamiliar with the implications of these. 133
I remember at the time I was working with the Ontario government,
134
and both another young lawyer and I had been working at the time on consti-
tutional negotiations because we were always involved in constitutional ne-
gotiations in Canada and dealing with the Quebec issue, et cetera. This other
lawyer was working with the Ministry of Intergovernmental Affairs. I was
working with the Attorney General. 135 Once the constitutional stuff was fi-
nished, we were turning our mind to the NAFTA issue and advising the On-
tario government because the Canadian government was seeking input from
the provinces. 36 This young lawyer I remember at the time was telling eve-
ryone, he was really the only person I knew who was focusing on Chapter
11, do you understand what this is going to mean? People would sort of nod
their head and say, "we understand, but go back to your desk." In any event,
131 See generally, PUBLIC CITIZEN, NAFTA'S THREAT TO SOVEREIGNTY AND DEMOCRACY:
THE RECORD OF NAFTA CHAPTER 11 INVESTOR-STATE CASES 1994-2005 vii-viii (2005),
available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Chapter/ 2011 %20Report%20Final.pdf
(commenting on the background of NAFTA Chapter 11).
132 See id. at 1 (commenting on Chapter 11 rules regarding investment).
133 See SICE: Foreign Trade Information System, Canada: Bilateral Investment Treaties,
http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/CAN/CANBITS e.asp (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) (listing
every Canadian bilateral investment treaty, with most occurring after the signing of NAFTA).
134 See Torys L.L.P., supra note 129.
135 See id (commenting on John A. Terry's previous experience as a constitutional lawyer
with the Canadian Government).
136 See Chambers and Partners, Person Profile and Rankings: John A. Terry,
http://www.chambersandpartners.com/personprofile.aspx?cpk=403496&ssid=30856 (last
visited Oct. 16. 2009) (commenting on John A. Terry's previous experience in advising the
Canadian government on NAFTA Chapter 11 issues).
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this young lawyer' name was Barry Appleton.1 37 He went out and wrote a
book, Navigating NAFTA, 138 almost as soon as NAFTA came into force.
Since then, he has made a NAFTA Chapter 11 career, not only for himself,
but also many other Canadian government trade lawyers, and some trade
lawyers for Mexico. It has been a very busy and fulfilling NAFTA career
because he has been responsible for bringing the lion's share of Chapter 11
claims, particularly against the Canadian government. 1
39
Chapter 11 was asleep. We had the provision, the agreement. People did
not really appreciate what it meant. What happens then, when people like
Barry Appleton and others start getting involved and the more creative period
starts? What you have at this point in time is that around the world bilateral
investment treaties are beginning to be used by investors, typically for cases
such as natural resource expropriations, or hotels being seized, those kinds of
situations. 140 These are cases in which multinational corporations headquar-
tered in developed countries are bringing claims against developing coun-
tries.14
What is unique about NAFTA is that for the first time we get bilateral in-
vestment treaties applied between two developed economies, each with a
very creative and sophisticated bar of lawyers. We, as North American law-
yers, start to look carefully at these provisions, and see them through a new
lens, asking more than the typical question of 'has an investment been mi-
sappropriated?' We say, "Here is another level of review, maybe a last resort
level of judicial review," or, "can we fit this measure within the framework
of discrimination,"' 42 or, "here is this other clause, fair and equitable treat-
ment. 143 That is a very broad clause. Let us really try to put this thing to
work."
137 See Appleton & Associates, Barry Appleton, http://www.appletonlaw.com/files/
b-appleton%20bio.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2009) (describing Barry Appleton's practice area
and previous accomplishments).
138 Barry Appleton, NAVIGATING NAFTA: A CONCISE USER'S GUIDE TO THE NORTH
AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1994).
139 See Appleton & Associates, supra note 137.
140 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130 (describing the situation around the early Chapter
11 cases).
141 See William S. Dodge, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries:
Reflections on the Australian-United States Free Trade Agreement, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1, 4 (Jan. 2006) (discussing that Agreements which allow direct claims "invariably result in
claims against those [developing] countries").
142 See Todd Weiler, The Treatment of SPS Measures Under NAFTA Chapter 11: Prelimi-
nary Answers to an Open-Ended Question, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 229, 239-244
(2003) (commenting on the non-discriminatory provisions within Chapter 11).
143 See Patrick Dumberry, The Quest to Define 'Fair and Equitable Treatment'for Investors
Under International Law: The Case of the NAFTA Chapter 11 Pope & Talbot Awards, 3 J. OF
WORLD INVESTMENT 657 (2002) (detailing the developments in the proper interpretation to be
given to the concept of "fair and equitable treatment").
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That is the point where you start to see the interesting cases developing.
The first case takes Canadian officials by surprise. Ethyl Corporation, a
United States corporation, 144 which I understand was one of the inventors of
unleaded gasoline, 145 engages NAFTA to fight a law in Canada that bans the
imports and also regulates the intergovernmental trade of a gasoline addi-
tive. 4 6 They bring this claim for $250 million and settle it for fifteen million
dollars, 147 but not before the panel holds a jurisdictional hearing. 48 This
established the first real case law in NAFTA, and not before various envi-
ronmental groups and others awake to this. The first taste of Chapter 11 for
the Canadian public or is a sense of a threat to Canada's environmental poli-
cy. In the public realm, this starts to frame the perspective of Chapter 11 that
Michael talked about this morning. 1
49
There are two themes from this period. First of all, there is this theme
that Chapter 11 is bad for the environment. Three of the key cases brought
against each country are environmental cases. It begins with Ethyl150 and
then in Canada there is a second case, SD Myers. 15 1 This is a case brought
against the Canadian ban on the export of polychlorinated biphenyls, and it is
successful. 5 2 There is a case brought against Mexico, also another early
case, the Metalclad case, which is about Mexico's decision to overturn an
earlier decision with respect to a waste management site. 153 That is a suc-
cessful case and has strong and broad words about what expropriation
means. 1
54
Then of course there is the Methanex case that really becomes the poster
child case through that era,' 55 another case involving the ban on a gasoline
144 E.g., Ethyl Corporation, Locations, http://www.ethyl.com/About+Ethyl/Locations.htm
(last visited Oct. 16, 2009).
145 See Michelle Sforza and Mark Vallianatos, NAFTA and Environmental Laws: Ethyl
Corporation v. Government of Canada, GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, Apr. 1997,
http://globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/212-environment/4538 I.html.
146 See id
14" See Kavaljit Singh, QUESTIONING GLOBALIZATION 73-74 (2005).
148 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130, at 4 (commenting on Canada's loss in the jurisdic-
tional hearing).
149 See generally Canada-United States Law Institute, supra note 35, at 13 (stating Michael
Lynk spoke earlier in the morning).
1 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130, at 4.
"' See id at 5.
152 See Canada (Attorney General) v. S.D. Myers, [2004] F.C. 38 (Can.).
153 PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130, at 9.
154 See Stephen L. Kass and Jean M. McCarroll, The 'Metalclad' Decision Under NAFTA 's
Chapter 11, CARTER LEDYARD & MILBURN LLP, Oct. 27, 2000, available at
http://www.clm.com/pubs/pub-990359_1.html (commenting on the definition of 'expropria-
tion' used in the Metalclad decision).
155 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130, at 2.
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additive and the regulation of that gasoline additive. 156 Now that case is not
successful: it is an example, as Elliot mentions, of the United States stellar
record of defending Chapter 11 cases. The United States successfully de-
fended that case.157 In my view, that was also a very important decision, not
just in that particular case because of the particular facts, because it helped to
relieve some of this pressure that North American governments felt was be-
ing exerted on Chapter 1 1 as being something that was always going to be
bad for the environment.1
58
The second theme through this creative period was the creativity of law-
yers coming in and convincing clients to take on big issues. In Canada, we
had United Parcel Service going after Canada, Canada Post, and the entire
system of international postal regulations.' 59 We had claims being brought
against United States bans in regulation of beef that had been allegedly con-
taminated by Mad Cow disease,160 when the border ban continued longer
than it should have.
161
Also, you have the cases dealing with the lumber industry, 62 and most
dramatically the big claim against the countervailing duty system that Elliot
was talking about. 163 All these cases in my view were cases that were ambi-
tious cases, but when you looked at them in a hardheaded and objective light,
which I would argue that the tribunals did in each of these cases, they were
cases that were ultimately bound to fail. They were bound to fail if the sys-
tem was going to work in a way that was going to be balanced, predictable,
and based on the particular facts of this case and the particular provisions of
the treaty.
I think Elliot and I would probably disagree in that respect on the decision
in Canfor' 64 and Tembec, 165 but I think it was a reasonable interpretation for
the tribunal to come to. These cases, in my view, were overreaching cases,
and it was not surprising that a number of these cases failed. The creative
156 See id.
157 See id.
158 See, Adding Fuel to the Fire, AM. LAWYER, Aug. 1, 2009, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/talUPubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202432562596&slretum 1 &hbxlogin=1
(commenting on the court's decision to uphold an environmental law against Methanex).
159 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130, at 5.
160 See id. at 3.
161 See William Vitka, United States Ban on Canadian Cows Ends, CBS NEWS, July 18,
2005, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/06/25/national/main7O4258.shtml
(stating the United States ban on Canadian cattle lasted for over two years).
162 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130.
163 See id. at 2-4.
164 See United States Department of State, Canfor Corporation v. United States of America,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c7424.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
165 Tembec, Inc. v. United States, No. 05-00028, slip op. (U.S. Ct. Int'l Trade Oct. 13,
2006), available at http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/slip_op/Slipop06/06-152.pdf.
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period affected public debate. People saw Chapter 11 as this bad, problemat-
ic mechanism that interfered with the proper exercise of government authori-
ty. I think that period has passed. 
166
The other thing that happened is that Canada in particular, and to some
extent the United States as well, became quite careful in the way it drafted its
bilateral investment treaties with other states. This is very unfortunate, in my
view, for people who practice in this area and particularly for investors. For
example, we have a recent Free Trade Agreement that Canada entered into
with Peru. 167 Also, Canada entered into a Foreign Investment Protection
Agreement, what we call a FIPA or bilateral investment treaty, with Peru.
168
It is fifty pages long with fifty-two pages of reservations. 169 You compare
that to the bilateral investment treaty between the Netherlands and Peru, a
seven-page agreement. 170 Guess which one of those is a lot more effective in
protecting the interests of Canadian multinational companies investing in
Peru: the nice, clear, simple, short one.
I have a lot of appreciation as a lawyer working in this area for short, con-
cise treaties; they are read and understood quickly and have effective provi-
sions. The trouble is that now in Canada, because we got spooked so much
by some of these NAFTA cases brought during the creative period, we bring
in all these layers and layers of reservations and exceptions that when you are
acting for an investor trying to enforce one of these treaties abroad, it be-
comes problematic.
The third phase that we are in now is this settled phase. I think we have
dealt with a number of the key jurisprudential questions. Number one, the
jurisprudence has settled on questions like environmental regulation. As
long as a measure is nondiscriminatory and for a public purpose, it is not
going to be expropriation.1 71 With the rejection of the Cattlemen's NAFTA
166 See generally, Public Citizen, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Cases: Bankrupting
Democracy, http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfn?ID=7076 (last visited Oct. 19,
2009) (commenting on several problems with Chapter 11).
167 See Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Canada - Peru Free Trade Agree-
ment, http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/andean-
andin/can-peru-perou.aspx (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
168 See Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Investments, Can.-Peru, Nov. 14, 2006, available at http://www.intemational.gc.ca/
trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/Canada-Peru 1OnovO6-en.pdf.
169 See id.
170 See Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments Between
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Peru, Neth.-Peru, Dec. 27, 1994, availa-
ble at http://www.sice.oas.org/Investment/BITSbyCountry/BITs/PERNetherlands.pdf.
171 See EMMA AISBETT, LARRY KARP, AND CAROL McAuSLAND, REGULATORY TAKINGS AND
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN NAFTA's CHAPTER 11 8 (2005), available at
http://are.berkeley.edu/courses/EEP1 31/oldfiles/lectureNotes/CarolEmmafragment.pdf (stat-
ing the court in the Methanex decision upheld an environmental regulation since it was non-
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claim, settled jurisprudence exists as to when you can bring a claim to have
an investment in another jurisdiction.
There have been some findings with respect to damages and lost profits,
which I think have made claimants more realistic in assessing their likely
success of recovering damages. 72 All of this adds to certainty, creates rea-
sonable expectations that help in terms of parties interacting under this sys-
tem.
The panel settled the costs issue in a reasonable way. You still do not
know, if you are bringing a claim, whether you are going to have costs or-
dered against you. Many tribunals will just divide costs. 173 Some tribunals
have awarded costs, and those costs awards can be very significant in some
cases, 174 but I think that again sets the right balance. If an investor is going
to engage this process with a claim that is not a meritorious claim or that is
sort of in a gray area leaning towards non-meritorious, they have to under-
stand there will potentially be very significant cost implications.
Another matter relatively settled is issue of judicial review of NAFTA
Chapter 11 awards. Particularly in Canada there have been a number of cas-
es in that area. 175 In my view, a fortunate result of that jurisprudence has
been that the courts have applied the same deferential approach they always
take to international commercial arbitrations by deferring to the decisions of
these tribunals. 176 Chapter 11 has also survived a constitutional challenge in
Canada, 177 and I do not know whether something like that might happen at
some point in the United States, but we are fine at least on the Canadian side
on that.
There are still many cases and I respectfully disagree with Elliot in terms
of the robustness of the case activity that is out there. There are currently
discriminatory and for a public purpose).
172 See Jack J. Cole Jr., Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in its Tenth Year: An Interim
Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues, and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1400-01
(2003) (commenting on the probability of non-recovery in Chapter 11 suits is high).
173 See Methanex Corp v. United States, SUBMISSION OF COSTS OF RESPONDENT UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 2 (2004), available at http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/Meth
anex/MethenexUSsubReCosts.pdf (stating that tribunals can apportion costs between parties if
it determines the apportionment to be reasonable).
174 See Whitsitt, supra note 71 (commenting on the high costs associated with Chapter 11
litigation).
17 See Rajeev Sharma and Adam Goodman, Ontario Court of Appeals Upholds NAFTA
Chapter 11 Reward, THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAWYER, Feb. 2005,
http://www.asil.org/insight040214.cfm (stating the Ontario Court of Appeals upheld NAFTA
Chapter 11 awards in a few cases).
176 Id.
177 Martha, Peden, NAFTA Tribunals are Constitutional, CENTRE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
STUDIES, July 26, 2009, http://www.law.ualberta.ca/centres/ccs/rulings/naftatribunalsarecons
titutional.php.
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thirteen cases pending against Canada'78 on a wide range of topics ranging
from a business that is being unfairly treated to challenges 179 to pesticide
laws 180 to landfill site closings 18 1 to milk-marking provisions.' 82 Parties are
still bringing a range of different cases. There are currently fewer claims
right now against the United States,' 83 and the United States still retains its
impressive record of victories. 184 The biggest concern from the United States
counsel is what happens if we lose? It is nice to win cases, but as counsel
you get more and more nervous when you win each one about what is going
to happen the next time because you have a record to protect.
In my view, Chapter 11 is working in that respect. Another example I
give in terms of working is we have had in Canada some recent examples of
classic or arguably classic expropriation. Michael talked about this in the
case of Newfoundland. 185 These classic expropriation cases are ideally suited
to being resolved through the Chapter 11 process.
In terms of some of the future issues, one of immediate concern relates to
the Buy American provisions and how Chapter 11 might relate to them.
186
This is something we are looking at carefully from Canada's perspective. I
have a number of clients who have serious concerns because they are dealing
with integrated investments across the border. They are finding that they are
being potentially shut out of various contracts on the basis of Canadian con-
tent.
There was a previous case, the ADF case, a challenge by a Canadian in-
vestor that dealt with this area.' 87 It is clear from that case that if it is a case
of pure procurement, you cannot bring, for example, a discrimination case, a
most favored nation case, or a national treatment case. 188 However, you
178 Public Citizen, supra note 130, at 6-9.
179 Id.
180 See id at 8 (stating Dow Chemical's challenge to Canadian pesticide bans).
181 See id. at 7 (commenting on V.G. Gallo's claim against Northern Ontario for blocking a
potential landfill site).
182 See generally id. (commenting on every pending NAFTA Chapter 11 challenge).183 See id. at 1-4 (listing only four pending NAFTA Chapter 11 cases against the United
States).
184 See id
185 See NAFTA Claims, AbitibiBowater Inc. v. Canada, http://www.treatyclaims.com
/NAFTA/News/Entries/2008/12/18_AbitibiBowater Inc._v._Canada.html (last visited Oct.
20, 2009).
186 See Anthony Faiola and Lori Montgomery, Trade Wars Brewing In Economic Malaise:
Outrage in Canada as United States Firms Sever Ties To Obey Stimulus Rules, WASH. POST,
May 15, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/
05/14/AR2009051404241_pf.html (stating Canadian discontent over the newly enacted 'Buy
American' provisions).
187 See United States Department of State, ADF Group Inc. v. United States of American,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3754.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009).
188 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130, at 2.
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could potentially bring these types of claims if you are in a situation where
the effect of the Buy American provisions has been tantamount to expropria-
tion of result in egregious unfairness. In those kinds of situations, a claimant
may potentially a claim under NAFTA Article 1105, Fair and Equitable
Treatment, 189 or Article 1110, Expropriation.'
90
There are also climate change issues that are going to be coming. Likely
these will develop as a subset of the number of the environmental issues that
are out there already in Chapter 11 cases. It is inevitable in my mind that
climate change legislation will affect some business somewhere in a way that
they feel violates Chapter 11 provisions. Even if governments are bringing
state-to-state dispute resolution claims, there will be a general tendency
among some investors not to want to wait for state-to-state diplomacy or
state-to-state dispute resolution, but instead to bring their own Chapter 11
claim.
One of the interesting things I can see coming up in the next year or so is
that Canada is likely to finally ratify the ICSID treaty, the Convention of the
Settlement of International Disputes.1 91 This is interesting under NAFTA
because, once Canada ratifies ICSID, then both United States and Canada are
parties to ICSID. 192 Why does that matter? It matters because if you look at
the arbitral provisions under Chapter 11, right now there is no way a dispute
can actually go to ICSID proper. We can take disputes to the ICSID Addi-
tional Facility Rules,1 93 and we can have them decided under the
UNCITRAL rules. 194 However, to use ICSID proper both parties must be
parties to ICSID.
1 95
If an investor decides that it wants to go the ICSID route and there is a
decision rendered by the tribunal, there is a specific procedure under ICSID
for judicial reviews. This procedure is called the annulment procedure under
189 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993).
190 Id.
191 See ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES (2006), available at
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFilesibasicdoc/CRR-English-final.pdf.
, 2 International Centre of Settlement of Investment Disputes, List of Contracting States
and Other Signatories of the Convention, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&language=English (last visited Nov.
5, 2009).
193 See ICSID ADDITIONAL FACULTY RULES (2006), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/
ICSID/StaticFiles/facility/AFREnglish-final.pdf.
194 See United Nations on International Trade Law, UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976),
available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules/arb-rules.pdf.
195 See The Free Library, Feds Near Ratification Of ICSID - Important Tool For Canadian
Investors Abroad, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Feds Near Ratification Of ICSID - Important
Tool For Canadian (last visited Oct. 27, 2009) (commenting on Canada's inability to utilize
the ICSID Convention Rules until Canada ratifies the Convention).
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which there is a further tribunal appointed through ICSID to deal with re-
quests to annual ICSID tribunal decisions. 196 The threshold of review is
much narrower than normal appellate review, but it is very similar to judicial
review where a party makes an application to set aside an arbitral award un-
der United States or Canada law.
As a result, once Canada ratifies the ICSID treaty, we potentially may
have cases where the review of an arbitral decision is not by a court in Cana-
da, if the arbitration is in Canada, and not by a court in the United States if
the arbitration is there, but by a body that is not a court in either Canada or
the United States. This could cause concern to the public in Canada because
the argument would be that in Canada, not only do we have first of all this
international arbitral tribunal deciding a key issue, but also now we cannot
even review it by means of our own courts. There was some sense of safe-
guard in the case of the Metalclad case that at least there was a review under
a Canadian court. 197 However, once the ICSID convention is ratified and if a
party goes the ICSID route, there will be no review whatsoever by a Cana-
dian or a United States court of that decision.
198
In terms of recommendations, my general sense is that NAFTA is work-
ing. We have gone through a lot of bumps and are now at a settled stage.
We are also moving into an area where the old idea of a bilateral investment
treaty being between developed and developing states is changing all over
the world.
We also have trade negotiations that are about to commence between
Canada and the European Union. 199 There may well be investment provi-
sions that are contained in that treaty should it come to pass. This all sug-
gests that you can have bilateral investment treaty provisions between devel-
oped countries, such as NAFTA, that can work very well.
I want to put on the record the following recommendations. Number one,
the NAFTA parties should consider, and Canada and the United States in
particular should consider, whether they really want to have parties going an
ICSID route where there would be no Canadian and United States review. I
do not think any of the governments involved have really turned their mind
to that issue. I think they should consider whether they want the ICSID An-
196 See ICSID CONVENTION, REGULATIONS AND RULES, supra note 191, at 26-27.
197 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130, at 9-10.
198 See J. Anthony VanDuzer and Anthony Daimsis, A Closer Look at Canada's Imminent
Accession to the ICSID Convention, 35 CANADIAN COUNCIL INT'L L. BULL. 4 (2009) (stating
that if Canada ratifies the ICSID Convention, Canada will not have recourse to any eventual
awards in domestic courts).
199 See Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, Canada-European Union: Compre-
hensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Negotiations, http://www.international.gc.
ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/eu-ue/can-eu-report-intr-can-ue-rapport-
intro.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2009).
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nulment Procedure to apply, or whether they want to agree that the current
process of review by the courts of the place of arbitration should continue to
apply.
Number two: one of the things that I find working in this area is that the
investment arbitration is an expensive and very long process.2 °0 Part of this
is because you often get a bifurcation between jurisdiction and merits in
many of these cases. The typical respondent state approach is to bring a ju-
risdictional motion arguing that there is not a proper investment or for some
reason the tribunal does not have jurisdiction.2 01 This can often mean that a
case takes an extra two years longer than it should.
This is great for lawyers. Clearly, it means more hours and more legal
fees. It equally clearly has no benefit for investors and clients. In that re-
spect, I would propose that a rule be adopted creating a presumption that
jurisdiction and merits should be heard together unless it is clearly not in the
interest of the particular dispute to do so - basically something that would
shift the onus to the person wanting to bifurcate the two proceedings to show
that it was unfair to hear them together. For example, if the case against the
tribunal taking jurisdiction is very strong, it may make no sense for both par-
ties to invest substantial effort in developing their arguments on the merits
argument. I would have some sort of onus shifting provision there that
forces parties to blend together jurisdiction and merits unless they could es-
tablish that it was not the appropriate way to do it.
Also, under Chapter 11, there are two procedures you can use.202 There is
an ICSID procedure, which right now is the ICSID Additional Facility
Rules, 20 3 or there is the UNCITRAL procedure.20 4 Many parties will go for
the ICSID route because there is the secretariat based on the World Bank that
can help you administer it. 205 The UNCITRAL route has a lot of benefits to
it, and it is a better route for bringing these cases typically, but there is no
secretarial support and there is very little in the way of backup if the other
party isn't cooperating. It would be very useful for the parties, if the gov-
ernments agree and I appreciate it might not be in their interest to do so, to
200 See Peter Clark & Gordon LaFortune, Why Can't NAFTA Chapter 11 be More Like the
WTO?, TRANSN'L Disp. MGMT., May 2004, available at http://www.transnational-dispute-
management.com/samples/freearticles/tvl-2-article39a.htm (commenting that Chapter 11
cases can be a long process because of jurisdictional issues).
201 See generally id. (commenting on delays in Chapter 11 cases caused by jurisdictional
issues).
202 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 189.
203 ICSID ADDITIONAL FACULTY RULES, supra note 193.
204 United Nations on International Trade Law, supra note 194.
205 See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Organizational Structure
of ICSID, http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal =
RightFrame &FromPage=Organization%20and%20Structure&pageName=Organization (last
visited Oct. 28, 2009).
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establish a dispute resolution institution that could support NAFTA Chapter
11 claims brought using either the ICSID or UNCITRAL routes. This would
of course require the cooperation of ICSID, which has its own secretariat and
establishes its own procedures.2 °6
On the ICSID side, one of the problems when you bring an ICSID pro-
ceeding is you bring your request for arbitration, which is essentially your
statement of claim.20 7 Then there is no requirement from the other party to
provide a statement of defense right away.208 If the respondent brings a ju-
risdictional motion, you have to deal with that jurisdictional motion, and you
do not see a statement of defense sometimes for two or three years later.
Therefore, you do not really know what case you have to meet. In the mean-
time, you are spending a lot of money and a lot of time just trying to get
through the jurisdictional issue. I would like to see the ICSID rules reformed
so they would be more like the UNCITRAL rules where you file your request
for arbitration and the respondent must file its statement of defence forth-
with.20
9
The other thing that I, as an investor lawyer, find of concern is the limita-
tion periods that currently exist. This is probably something that moves
beyond mere process to substance. There is a three-year limitation right
now,210 and it becomes very complicated and technical for an investor be-
cause you have to give six months notice before you actually commence a
claim. 211 If an investor has waited for more than two-and-a-half-years after
the date it should have been aware of the loss and it has not yet given notice,
it is effectively out of luck because the six months will take them past the
three-year period. I am aware of cases in which that has tripped up investors,
and in my view, it would be very helpful to clarify the provisions around that
either to extend the limitation period or simply to provide more clearer pre-
cedents and examples for investors that are contemplating bringing these
claims. In the end, if the investment treaty mechanism is going to work ef-
fectively you need to have it done in a way that simplifies the procedures as
much as possible and makes them less costly. These are a few modest pro-
posals, and I look forward to questions. Thanks.
206 See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, supra note 191.
207 See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, How to File a Request,
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/HowToFileReq.jsp (last visited Oct. 28, 2009) (stat-
ing that the request must contain information that indicates there is a legal dispute, between
the two parties, arising directly out of an investment).
208 See generally ICSID ADDITIONAL FACULTY RULES, supra note 193 (indicating the ICSID
rules do not contain any provisions requiring the opposing party to provide a statement of
defense in a timely manner).
209 See United Nations on International Trade Law, supra note 194, at 13-14.
210 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 189.
211 id.
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DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF ELLIOT J. FELDMAN
AND JOHN A. TERRY
MR. MEYER: Thank you very much. I have a question for either of the
panelists. I looked at Elliot's scorecard of the cases brought, and I agree with
him in that he has only shown the Chapter 11 cases where it went beyond the
notice of intent, because in a lot of these cases, the notice of intent is filed,
and basically that is the end of it because the client does not want to get into
the more costly part of the process, which is pleadings, et cetera.
Now, if I look at this document, since the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect fifteen years ago, twenty-eight cases
went beyond the filing a notice of intent,212 and I filed notices of intent that
were two pages.213 It is not a big deal. Thirteen cases were brought against
the United States, 214 four against Canada,215 and eleven against Mexico.
216
There were twenty-eight cases over the last fifteen years.21 7 As I understand
it, six of them went to cash awards against the government. Over fifteen
years, once every two-and-a-half years, we have a government paying out.
John, your conclusion intrigues me because you seem to be saying that
you still think this thing is for real. I have to tell you as a practitioner I do
not think this thing is for real. Parties file many notices of intent and then do
not follow up. The environmental movement always focuses on the notices
of intent, and then it looks like the sky is falling. There is a lot of bluffing
here, and there is a lot of the little boy crying wolf, and at some point, the
process loses credibility. I think it has lost credibility.
One of the reasons that it does not go beyond the letter of intent stage is
because in Canada, lawyers do a lot of this work on a contingency fee basis.
When lawyers try to shop it and get another law firm to take the case and to
actually put real money on the table, there are no takers, and therefore the
case has lapsed.
You said we are in a different stage now, do you think we have moved
away from the contingency fee model to people that actually pay real mon-
ey? I would like Elliot's view on that.
MR. TERRY: May I go first?
MR. MEYER: Go ahead.
212 See generally, PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130 (listing every NAFTA Chapter 11 case
filed).
213 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 189 (listing the mi-
nimal requirements for the notice of intent).
214 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130 (listing every Chapter 11 case filed against the
United States).
215 See id (listing every Chapter 11 case filed against Canada).
216 See id. (listing every Chapter 11 case filed against Mexico).
217 See id. at 13.
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MR. TERRY: First of all, a lot of this is about lawyers and lawyers tak-
ing cases on contingency. What I have found happening at the bar is that the
real work for lawyers is primarily on some of the bigger bilateral investment
treaty cases where you have, for example, Canadian mining companies get-
ting mines expropriated abroad, or major money cases, and there are some
significant awards being handed out in respect to that.
I have a claim against Venezuela now.218 In the Venezuelan context, par-
ties brought four or five claims against Venezuela. We will see whether they
result in judgments or not, because of course there are all sorts of factors in
each case and particular facts in the case that are at stake. However, parties
bring claims with more frequency against certain other countries around the
world because of the processes in those countries; Canada, the United States,
and Mexico do not engage in those types of processes. 219 There should not
be an expectation that we should have a decision a year against a government
here.
During what I call the creative period, there were expectations about
Chapter I I's uses in a number of cases in which there seemed to be theoreti-
cally some kind of national treatment issue involved. For example, if you
take the words fair and equitable treatment 220 and adopt a very broad inter-
pretation of those, they are applicable to many potential violations. Howev-
er, tribunals have recently focused on what customary international law says
about fair and equitable treatment.221 We are talking about a limited set of
egregious circumstances. Let us not start to interfere with fundamental poli-
cy decisions about how you run a post office and things like that. In my
view, Chapter 1 's original focus and concern was Mexico. In the end,
probably not a legitimate concern, given how Mexican policies have played
out, but it was that traditional bilateral investment treaty concern.
Lawyers tried to elevate it beyond that. They succeeded in some respects
but not in others. In my view, it is doing more or less what it should be.
Right now, there are thirteen cases, 222 a number of which are currently active
right now against the Canadian government.223 Some will be successful, and
a number will not proceed much further.
218 See Torys L.L.P., supra note 129.
219 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130, at 3-4 (indicating that Canadian companies have
only four pending cases against the United States).
220 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 189.
221 See Damon Vis-Dunbar, Canadian First Nations Chief Intervenes in NAFTA Chapter 11
Tobacco Dispute, INVESTMENT TREATY NEWS, Feb. 27, 2009, http://www.investinenttreaty
news.org/cms/news/archive/2009/02/27/canadian-first-nations-chief-intervenes-in-nafta-
chapter- 1-tobacco-dispute.aspx (commenting on United States argument that the definition of
'fair and equitable treatment' should be the same as that under customary international law).
222 See PUBLIC CITIZEN, supra note 130 at 6-9.
223 See id.
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You must keep in mind that companies also use these as lobbying tech-
niques and they will bring these cases in an effort to try to overturn laws.224
To some extent, it serves a purpose there and sometimes even result in
changes without there ever being a claim brought. Those are all the exam-
ples to my mind as to why NAFTA Chapter 1 1 is working as it should.
MR. FELDMAN: I really cannot say anything about the contingency fee
issue. I have no idea. I had not probably fully appreciated the extent to
which I was attacking John's livelihood when I questioned Chapter 11.
There should be a state investor provision, but the provision in NAFTA
probably has irreparable flaws. John thinks that the tribunal's assessment
was reasonable, but for Chapter 11 there is no discipline on the American
abuse of the trade law.
According to that tribunal on which one of the tribunal members chosen
by the United States and approved by the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was the President's first cousin, with the case
brought against the President, he refused to recuse,225 and ICSID said that is
okay. That was the tribunal that said you could not question the trade laws
through Chapter 11 because of the presence of Chapter 19 in the agree-
ment.226 Well, then you need an agreement that Chapter 19 does not burden.
There needs to be some kind of discipline on the American abuse of the trade
laws. That is a state investor question.
I have a reservation about Chapter 11 in that regard and in other regards,
and I may also now be putting at risk Paul's livelihood, but if you draw arbi-
trators off an ICSID list, governments provide all the ICSID lists. 227 If you
are a private investor and you argue your case in front of an ICSID tribunal,
you argue in front of a tribunal selected, in effect, by governments, states,
and those folks who draw their livelihood from being arbitrators. Therefore,
when they rule for the investor, the chances of their being included again on
the list by their governments become smaller.
Consequently, you are, as an investor, always in a bind about how to
choose the arbitrators if you are relying on the ICSID facility. Careful shap-
ing of these kinds of technical rules gives the investors a fair chance. If the
224 See WESTERN ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH COUNCILS, NAFTA CHAPTER 11: PUTTING
PROFIT BEFORE PEOPLE 1 (2003), available at http://www.worc.org/userfiles/fs-NAFTA%20
chapter/o2011 (2).pdf.
22F See generally Tembec's Opposition to the United States' Motion to Dismiss, Tembec v.
United States, No. 07-CV-1905, 7 (D.D.C. 2008) (discussing the marriage of Mr. Robinson to
President George Walker Bush's first cousin Susanne Walker).
226 See generally id.
227 See ROBERTO DANiNO, ICSID Sec'y Gen., MAKING THE MOST OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: A COMMON AGENDA (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/8/
36053800.pdf (stating the parties are constrained by the list of arbitrators appointed by ICSID
Contracting States).
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investor has a fair chance, then what John has I think quite accurately told us
and what you are invoking, then there is an environmental movement that
says this is terrible. Chapter 11 of course has been the most controversial of
the chapters in NAFTA precisely because people perceived it as that kind of
threat.2
28
I do not know whether parties bring the cases on contingency and that is
why there is no follow-through, but I can certainly say that the cases are
enormously expensive. 229 However, the reason that we have the provision is
because we do not trust the Court proceedings. I am suggesting we should
not necessarily trust the arbitration either.
MR. ROBINSON: Just a small point. You do not have to use the ICSID
list.2
30
MR. FELDMAN: No, you do not.
MR. ROBINSON: None of the three were on their list.
MR. FELDMAN: If there is a consolidation, which is what we expe-
rienced, then you go to the ICSID list, and that is required in Chapter 11 231
MR. ROBINSON: The United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law trumps ICSID in Chapter 1 1 anyway.
MR. FELDMAN: Not if there is a consolidation.232
MS. IRISH: Maureen Irish, University of Windsor.233 I have a question
mainly for Elliot on the problem of overlapping jurisdictions with these vari-
ous dispute settlement fora. Canada has had this problem. Mexico had this
problem as well. Was it really such a good idea for Canada to take softwood
lumber to parallel the proceedings in NAFTA and at the World Trade Organ-
ization (WTO)? Would not it have been better to choose one or the other?
MR. FELDMAN: I just read an article this week that just appeared in a
journal by someone who would appear to be English because he thought our
judges were justices. He apparently spent two years in the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade as an observer, and developed this
article. This was one of his main themes. It is about the softwood lumber
history with one or two small errors; it is quite a good analysis.
228 See Bronwyn Pavey & Tim Williams, The North American Free Trade Agreement:
Chapter 11, http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/inbrief/prb0254-e.htm (last
visited Oct. 31, 2009) (commenting on the possible threats Chapter 11 poses to governments).
229 See Clark & LaFortune, supra note 200.
230 See Mark Kantor, Kantor-Howse Exchange Regarding Restrictions on Public Access to
ICSID Arbitrations, TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT, Feb. 2004, available at
http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/samples/freearticles/tvl -1-article_57.htm.
21 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 189.
232 See Kantor, supra note 230.
233 See University of Windsor, Maureen Irish: Professor of Law,
http://web4.uwindsor.ca/law/irish (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (giving a brief biography of
Maureen Irish as a professor at the University of Windsor).
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He asked this very question. I will try to track his answer. His answer is
in part that some of the things Canada accomplished were not possible with-
out being in both forums. The most important he focuses on is zeroing.234
We could not have prevailed on zeroing before the NAFTA panel but for the
WTO decision. Moreover, we had to finesse the NAFTA panel because
twice it said no, and we stalled it while we got WTO decisions. As the WTO
moved them along, we were then able to invoke the Charming Betsy doc-
trine235 back to the NAFTA panel. That is how we won zeroing. First, it is
the only time zeroing has been defeated under United States law, and it was
the opening to the Europeans and Japanese to get a broader condemnation of
zeroing. 236 He regards this as a very important victory that was only possible
by being in both forums.
He neglects the Canadian victory at the WTO on the preliminary determi-
nation in subsidies.237 This is a very controversial area, and Jean Anderson
and I have disagreed on this vehemently. Canada won a very resounding
victory at the WTO on the preliminary determination and then never fol-
lowed through on it.238 It accepted in effect the American argument that
going to the final determination mooted it. I thought that was erroneous. I
thought it stood on its own and followed up. It was a strategic question, and
I did not like the answer, and that would have made a difference as to what
kind of benefits there were from the WTO.
The reason the question arises is because of Section 129 in United States
law239 and the American attempt to take the WTO loss and the NAFTA loss
and convert them into a victory. We have now answered that question. The
United States Court of International Trade has said you cannot do that, and
the United States Court of International Trade in effect struck down the use
of 129 that way. 24° The bad experience that extended the case out a year
because the United States in effect went up to the edge but did not break the
law in failing to implement the results of the NAFTA panel by using the al-
234 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States - Final Dumping
Determination on Softwood Lumber from Canada, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/enforc
ement/dispute-settlement-proceedings/wto-dispute-settement/final-dumping-determi (last
visited Oct. 31, 2009) (commenting on the Panel's decision relating to 'zeroing').
235 See Michael Franck, The Future of Judicial Internationalism: Charming Betsy, Medellin
v. Dretke, and The Consular Rights Dispute, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 515, 521 (2006) (describing the
Charming Betsy Doctrine).
236 See generally Dan Ikenson, Zeroing In: Antidumping's Flawed Methodology under Fire,
11 FREE TRADE BULLETIN (2004) (discussing the effects of the United States losing the WTO
decision against Canada).
237 See Canadians say WTO Lumber Decision a Big Victory, CBS NEWS, July 26, 2005,
htp://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2002/07/26/softwood2_wtoO20726.html.38 See id.
239 See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, H.R. 5110 Section 129 (1994).
240 See Tembec, supra note 165.
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leged implementation of the WTO panel the reverse way. The Court of In-
ternational Trade (CIT) said you could not do that. That problem is gone.
The United States tried very hard to force Canada into a choice of forum,
to ask the question you are asking, to make it make a choice. I think it has
now lost that argument because of the CIT decision. 241 Now, the CIT deci-
sion came down in July and the Softwood Lumber Agreement (SLA) in Oc-
tober.242 On October 1, the Canadian government said it was going to take a
month to sort things out, and it rammed the agreement through on October 12
by amending secretly in seventeen pages of amendments, the terms for enter-
ing the agreement into force because it did not have the support of the indus-
try to do it.
243
Also, it accelerated the process because it knew that another decision was
coming down from the CIT, that one, the one that would finalize and com-
plete that process, which came down within twenty-four hours of the SLA
entry into force. 244 The American view is that it did not happen. There were
procedural motions filed by the United States to try to erase that resolution.
They failed.
MR. SILLS: Mark Sills from Fasken Martin.245 I just wanted to address
a comment that Elliot Feldman made. We moved on to the NAFTA, and he
said that NAFTA does not address any of the major trade issues of the mo-
ment, which revolve around security and related concerns and environmental
concerns. From my own experience, I was on the Canadian negotiation
team246 and looked at NAFTA on the energy chapter, and I can tell you that
the team addressed the National Security provision, as it applies to bilateral
trade, long and hard.247
The United States Trade Representative at the time was completely unwil-
ling to contemplate any impairment of the American ability to invoke Gener-
al Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article 21.248 Since 2001, we
241 Coalition for Fair Labor Imports, supra note 94 at 5.
242 Id.
243 See generally, UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, A CN CANADA - US
TRADE RELATIONS FORUM: THE CANADA - US SOFTWOOD LUMBER AGREEMENT 2006 4-5
(2007), http://apps.business.ualberta.ca/wcer/Softwood%20Forum/Media%20Release%20103
.pdf (generally mentioning the industry's lack of support of the Softwood Lumber Agree-
ment).
244 See Tembec, supra note 165.
245 See Fasken Martineau, Mark N. Sills: Partner, http://www.fasken.com/mark-sills/ (last
visited Oct. 31, 2009) (giving a brief biography of Mark N. Sills).
246 Id.
247 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 6: Energy and Basic Petrochemi-
cals, http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/NAFTA/chap-06.asp#Chap.VI (last visited Oct. 31, 2009)
(listing the national security measures contained in NAFTA Chapter 6).
248 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 21: Exceptions,
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/NAFTA/chap-21.asp#P.VIII (last visited Oct. 31, 2009) (listing
[Vol. 34, No. 2]
36
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 34 [2008], Iss. 2, Art. 19
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol34/iss2/19
Feldman & Terry-North American Dispute Resolution
faced a lot of measures that in a sense have been sheltered under Article 21 in
the GATT, and in fact will impair the Canadian access to American markets
in many respects. However, it is not because we did not think of it; it was
thought of and it was addressed. The problem was that the American admin-
istration of the day was unwilling to contemplate any of GATT's existence in
that area. The environmental issue was again addressed long and hard, but
environment was at that point considered to be an impediment to a trade
agreement.
That is the reality, and that is why the environmental side agreements ad-
dress the issue. The point is that Canada always wanted to achieve a broader,
more comprehensive agreement that it takes two to tango, and in America in
1991, the tango partner simply was not there.
MR. FELDMAN: I have a feeling you are agreeing with me. What I am
interpreting you to say is that the architecture of NAFTA does not deal with
those things.
MR. SILLS: By design.
MR. FELDMAN: Well, whatever. NAFTA does not deal with those
things. However that came about for whatever reason and whatever the ne-
gotiating situation was at the time. I am suggesting to you that you have new
conditions, a new agenda, and a new President of the United States. If you
do not want to be marginalized in the global system, then as Jessica was sug-
gesting, it is your turn and it is your opportunity to be creative and innovative
and put on the table something that is new and different. I think if you miss
that opportunity, you will miss it forever, and I think Jessica was suggesting
something similar. I think that opportunity is here and now. There is a
common expectation that Republicans in the United States are free traders
and Democrats are protectionist. I have been practicing for twenty years, and
the most protectionist period I have experienced in dealing with the United
States Trade Representative and the United States Department of Commerce
were the last eight with a Republican Congress and a Republican President.
You now have a Democratic President, a Democratic Congress, all of the
signals of protectionism, and all the suspicions that I think are justified. I
think you also have a new opportunity that you personally may be underes-
timating and Canada would underestimate at its peril.
MR. MEYER: Thank you, Elliot. I would like to thank you all for your
participation and interest. I would especially like to thank Elliot and John for
a very interesting session.
the general agreements on tariff and trade in NAFTA Chapter 21).
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